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Executive summary
In Uganda, the frequency of Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreaks is increasing, with many of the index case patients 
unable to account for their source of infection. Recent epidemiological work has revealed swine as a host for 
Ebolavirus. 
Agriculture is the backbone of Uganda’s economy, providing livelihoods to 80% of its citizens. The predicted fourfold 
population explosion in the next 40 years will place pressure on livestock production to address infections that affect 
production outputs in order to safeguard food security and human health. A more thorough understanding of how 
Ebolavirus infection impacts the health and welfare of pigs, and hence the health and livelihoods of pig farmers, will help 
prioritize how limited resources can be efficiently expended to ensure human health, livelihoods, food safety and food 
security.
The rising demand for pork in Uganda has sparked a massive expansion of pig production in the country. Pigs are 
preferred to other livestock species due to their relatively rapid growth rate, large litter sizes and potential to provide 
financial returns over a relatively short time. These higher pig populations, particularly those reared under tethering 
or free-range systems, overlap with fruit bat habitats. Where these pigs scavenge for food, they come in contact with 
dropped fruit, excrement, saliva, urine and faeces from suitable fruit bat hosts of Ebolavirus.
Furthermore, this intensification of pig production coupled with poor pig husbandry practices increases pig-human 
contact, a risk for direct transmission of Ebolavirus. In order to strengthen the pig value chain in Uganda, further 
research is warranted to determine what role pigs play in Ebolavirus transmission and specific risk factors for infection 
in pigs and from pigs to humans. Such foresight will help identify interventions that would minimize food instability, 
public health consequences, social stigma, mass public panic and negative economic impact from trade and travel 
restrictions associated with EVD outbreaks.
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Introduction and background
During the last decades, the demand for meat and milk has increased in the world, particularly in developing countries. 
Consumption of meat increased almost three times more in developing countries than in developed countries from 
early 1970 to the mid-1990s (Delgado and Narrod 2002). The trend is expected to continue. The need for fast 
maturing sources of animal protein which require low cereal inputs places nonruminant animals in prime position for 
fulfilling this growing demand (Thomas et al. 2013). To this end, pig production is becoming increasingly popular, with 
pork and poultry contributing 76% of the increased meat consumption in the developing world between 1982 and 
1998 (Delgado et al. 2001).
In sub-Saharan Africa, millions of small-scale farmers efficiently supply the great majority of the meat, milk and 
fish markets. Animal-source food products have a high nutritional value which enhances public health, while the 
production, transportation, processing and retailing of these products provide income and employment to millions. 
On the other hand, animal-source foods are the single most important source of foodborne disease. About 80% of the 
animal-source foods are distributed through informal markets without adequate safety inspection. As a result, most of 
the people living in the region are exposed to a variety of foodborne agents which can cause diarrhoea, fever, chronic 
wasting, abortions or even epilepsy and cancer. These infections can have severe negative impacts on the population, 
including a high infant mortality, and may contribute significantly to the region’s poverty. 
In Uganda, the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)-led Safe Food, Fair Food project aims to support 
development of the pig value chain through risk-based approaches to ensure food safety. A systematic literature 
review resulting in a risk assessment to determine the threat of Ebolavirus in the pig value chain in Uganda was 
warranted, considering the increase in pig numbers and pig density in areas of Uganda where EVD outbreaks have 
been recorded. This preliminary risk assessment served as a foresight study to determine whether further research 
resource mobilization was needed to ensure public health and food safety in the pig value chain.
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Methodology
In order to determine the risk of Ebolavirus in the pig value chain in Uganda, articles in published and grey literature 
related to Ebolavirus in pigs were identified through online databases, visiting university libraries and interviewing 
experts within Uganda. The following criteria were used to exclude publications from the study: date of publication, 
language of publication, animal species and content (with respect to prevalence, impact and control). 
Thus, for this risk assessment, a publication was excluded if it was produced before 1990, it was not written in English, 
the species was not porcine and the study did not refer to prevalence (presence of level of hazard in pigs, pork and pig 
products, people, or wildlife interacting with pigs), impact (economic cost, disability-adjusted life years, social or other 
burdens or environment) and control (risk factors, knowledge and control methods).
Databases searched included PubMed, CAB Direct, Web of Science, African Journals Online, Makerere University 
library, World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) global burden of disease, World Animal Health Information 
Database, HealthMap, International Symposia on Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics proceedings, Tropentag 
proceedings, ILRI institutional repository, International Food Policy Research Institute resources, WHO library 
database, International System for Agricultural Science and Technology, CDC and two national daily newspapers 
(Daily Monitor and New Vision). Relevant searches using the search terms ‘Uganda’ AND ‘Ebola’, ‘Ebola’ AND ‘pig’ 
OR ‘pork’ OR ‘porcine’ OR ‘swine’ were carried out on all the above databases and websites. 
An additional 15 expert interviews were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire. Finally, unpublished 
Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD theses from 1990 to the present at Makerere University, College of Veterinary 
Medicine, Animal Resources and Biosecurity were reviewed for relevant content on Ebolavirus in swine or diseases in 
swine that shared symptoms or histological changes similar to Ebolavirus infection in pigs. 
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Hazard identification
Using the Codex Alimentarius Commission framework for risk assessment, the Safe Food, Fair Food project adapted 
the framework for participatory risk assessments. The framework process is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Risk analysis framework developed by the ILRI-led Safe Food, Fair Food project.
Can it cause harm?
EVD is a severe, often-fatal zoonotic disease in humans, nonhuman primates (gorillas, chimpanzees, mandrills, guenon 
and other monkeys), duikers and bush pigs (The Center for Food Security and Public Health 2009) that has appeared 
sporadically since its initial recognition in 1976. The disease is caused by infection with Ebolavirus, named after a river 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in Africa, where it was first recognized. The ribonucleic acid (RNA) 
virus is one of two members in the family Filoviridae. There are five identified subtypes of Ebolavirus with a sixth 
waiting to be named from an outbreak currently ongoing in Guinea and Liberia (ProMED-mail 2014). Five of the six 
strains have caused disease in humans: Zaire ebolavirus, Sudan ebolavirus, Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus, Bundibugyo ebolavirus and 
the new strain causing the outbreak in Guinea and Liberia that has yet to be named. The sixth, Reston ebolavirus, has 
caused disease in nonhuman primates but not in humans (CDC 2009b).
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Can it be present in food?
Humans often become infected with Ebolavirus after handling sick and dead animals found in the forest, especially 
nonhuman primates, duikers (forest antelope) and fruit bats (CDC 2009a; The Center for Food Security and Public 
Health 2009; Feldmann and Geisbert 2011). Zaire ebolavirus transmission to humans has been clearly documented 
in central Africa through the hunting, butchering and consumption of bushmeat, especially gorillas and chimpanzees. 
Handling and consumption of freshly killed bats was associated with an outbreak of Zaire ebolavirus in DRC (Feldmann 
and Geisbert 2011). This close contact with organs and body fluids while hunting and consuming bushmeat and fruit 
bats puts people at risk of infection with Ebolavirus.
However, the Ebolavirus lipid envelope renders it relatively unstable in the environment. Infection in persons whose 
sole contact is with meat procured by others has not been reported and is probably rare, if it occurs at all. The 
greatest risk is probably among butchers and others who handle organs and body fluids of infected animals as a part 
of their occupation. Proper cooking of foods should inactivate infectious Ebolavirus although ingestion of contaminated 
food cannot be wholly ruled out as a possible route of exposure in natural infections (Feldmann and Geisbert 2011). It 
should be noted, however, that these observations come from remote African settings where there is little or no cold 
storage. The more reliable cold storage conditions typically involved in commercial pig farming could help preserve 
the virus (Bausch 2011).
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Hazard characterization
To identify the risk of Ebolavirus in pigs in Uganda, EVD ecology, significance, spatial distribution and prevalence are 
discussed below.
What harm does it cause?
In humans, Ebolavirus causes severe disease and high case fatality rates of 25–90%, depending on the strain (CDC 
2009a). During convalescence, which can be slow, some patients develop joint pain, deafness, pericarditis and orchitis 
(The Center for Food Security and Public Health 2009). Reports of intense familial and social stigma in recovered 
human patients are also common (Kinsman 2012).
In wildlife, Ebolavirus causes death in gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), mandrills (Mandrillus spp.), 
guenon (Cercopithecus spp.) and other monkeys as well as duikers (Cephalophus dorsalis) and bush pigs (Potamochoerus 
porcus) (Leroy et al. 2004; The Center for Food Security and Public Health 2009).
In domestic livestock, pigs are the only species, at present, found to be naturally infected with Ebolavirus (CDC 2009b). 
The disease course in pigs depends on the infective strain; Reston ebolavirus causes asymptomatic infection to mild 
respiratory symptoms (Barrette et al. 2009) and Zaire ebolavirus causes severe lung pathology (Kobinger et al. 2011). 
Histopathology on the lungs of the infected pigs showed inflammatory cells in the bronchiolar epithelium, alveolar 
septae, the lumen of the bronchiole and the nearby alveolar spaces. Additionally, alveoli were filled with oedema fluid, 
the bronchiole with luminal inflammatory exudates and the expansion of the pleura with fibrin. Immunohistochemical 
staining showed heavy staining throughout the lobule.
In 2012, Ugandan Muslims were banned from travel to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage for fear of importing Ebolavirus 
into Saudi Arabia. Also, due to the similarity in name between Kibaale District and Kibale National Park, a popular 
tourist destination for chimpanzee trekking in Uganda, many tourists from Western countries cancelled their summer 
holiday travel plans to Uganda. Travel alerts and restrictions issued by Western countries did nothing to help curb 
the fear of tourists becoming infected. This was particularly hard on the tourism sector as Lonely Planet had named 
Uganda ‘Best Country to Visit’ in 2012. Despite the accolades by Lonely Planet, tourist numbers decreased by 13% in 
2012 over 2011, with the month of September particularly hard hit with 50% fewer tourists than in 2011. This would 
coincide with the airing of news of an EVD outbreak in Kibaale District in international media outlets and tourists 
cancelling plans for wildlife tourism activities in Uganda (Uganda Wildlife Authority and Tushabe 2013).
During EVD outbreaks in Uganda, a case management team is organized that develops a response plan and mobilizes 
resources for the government and its partners. Essentially, all care is provided at no cost to the patients or their 
families. During burial, the relatives provide the coffin and passively participate in the burial which is presided over 
by a trained burial team. Survivors and their families are followed up by the psychosocial team to ensure smooth 
integration into the communities. All cases are also compensated for the materials destroyed by the infection control 
and burial teams. Presently, no targeted studies to determine the cost per patient have been undertaken (J.F. Wamala, 
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personal communication, 17 May 2013). This type of case management approach relies on patients presenting to 
health centres, overlooking those who rely on traditional healers for healthcare or do not have the means to access 
health centres as evidenced in Figure 2 which shows a deceased EVD patient removed directly from home.
Figure 2. Deceased EVD patient removed from home.
Photo courtesy of www.ifrc.org.
While most of the supportive care of infected patients takes place in healthcare centres in Uganda, at least one patient 
instituted his own infection control standards using buckets of Jik (bleach or sodium hypochlorite) (Oketch 2012).
How does harm depend on dose?
There is growing concern over transmission of Ebolavirus through the air between species (McGrath 2012) after 
Canadian scientists demonstrated that the virus was transmitted from pigs to monkeys without any direct contact 
between them (Kobinger et al. 2011). One to 10 aerosolized organisms are sufficient to cause infection in humans 
(Franz et al. 2001). 
There is little research linking dose to disease course and outcome. However, in humans, the route of infection 
seems to affect the disease course and outcome. For contact exposure, the mean incubation period for cases of 
Zaire ebolavirus via infection by injection was 6.3 days versus 9.5 days for direct contact exposure. Additionally, the 
case fatality rate in the 1976 DRC outbreak of Zaire ebolavirus was 100% (85 of 85) in cases associated with injection 
compared to 80% (119 of 149) in cases of known contact exposure (Feldmann and Geisbert 2011).
For nonhuman primates infected with Zaire ebolavirus, the disease course seems to progress faster in animals exposed 
by intramuscular or intraperitoneal injection than in animals exposed by aerosol droplets (Feldmann and Geisbert 
2011).
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Stability and viability
The virus can survive in liquid or dried material for a number of days (Leroy et al. 2004). Infectivity is found to be 
stable at room temperature or at 4C for several days and indefinitely stable at –70C (Evans and Kaslow 1997; 
Mwanatambwe et al. 2001). Infectivity can be preserved by lyophilization (Public Health Agency of Canada 2010).
Ebolavirus is susceptible to sodium hypochlorite, lipid solvents, phenolic disinfectants, peracetic acid, methyl alcohol, 
ether, sodium deoxycholate, 2% glutaraldehyde, 0.25% Triton X-100, β-propiolactone, 3% acetic acid (pH 2.5), 
formaldehyde and paraformaldehyde and detergents such as sodium dodecyl sulphate (Elliott et al. 1982; Mitchell and 
McCormick 1984; Evans and Kaslow 1997; Loutfy et al. 1998; Franz et al. 2001).
Ebolavirus is moderately thermolabile and can be inactivated by heating for 30–60 minutes at 60C, boiling for five 
minutes, gamma irradiation (1.2 × 106 rads to 1.27 × 106 rads) or ultraviolet radiation (Elliott et al. 1982; Mitchell and 
McCormick 1984; Evans and Kaslow 1997).
Classification and history
Ebolavirus belongs to a virus family called Filoviridae and can cause severe haemorrhagic fever in humans and 
nonhuman primates. So far, only two members of this virus family have been identified: Marburgvirus and Ebolavirus. 
The disease was originally named Ebola haemorrhagic fever, but due to the misconception that all infected patients 
develop haemorrhage, it was renamed EVD. Table 1 presents the recent naming convention of Ebolavirus. Ebolavirus 
is comprised of six species, namely, Sudan ebolavirus, Zaire ebolavirus, Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus also known as Taï Forest 
ebolavirus, Bundibugyo ebolavirus, Reston ebolavirus and a sixth strain yet to be named from the ongoing outbreak in 
Guinea. Reston ebolavirus is the only known filovirus that does not cause severe disease in humans but it can be fatal 
in monkeys (CDC 2012a). The Ebolavirus is a single-stranded, RNA virus, the type of virus known to have the widest 
range of gene expression strategies (Bruce and Brysiewicz 2002). 
Table 1. Recent naming convention of Ebolavirus and case fatality rates 
Genus/species Virus Abbreviation Human case fatality rate
Taï Forest ebolavirus Taï Forest virus TAFV Non-fatal (one case)
Reston ebolavirus Reston virus RESTV Non-fatal
Sudan ebolavirus Sudan virus SUDV 41–100%
Zaire ebolavirus Zaire virus ZEBV 47–100%
Bundibugyo ebolavirus Bundibugyo virus BDBV 25–55%
 
Source: CDC (2009a); Barrette et al. (2011).
Table 2 lists a chronology of known cases and outbreaks of EVD. Ebolavirus was first identified in 1976 when two 
outbreaks of EVD occurred in northern Zaire (now DRC) and southern Sudan. The outbreaks involved what 
eventually proved to be two different species of Ebolavirus. The outbreaks were named after the nations in which 
they were discovered. Both viruses showed themselves to be highly lethal, as 90% of the Zairian cases and 50% of the 
Sudanese cases resulted in death (CDC 2012a).
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Table 2. Known cases and outbreaks of EVD, in chronological order 
Year(s) Country
Ebola 
subtype
Reported 
number of 
human cases
Reported 
number (%) 
of deaths 
among cases
Situation
Confirmatory laboratory 
analysis
1976 Zaire (now 
DRC)
Ebola-Zaire 318 280 (88%) Occurred in Yambuku and 
surrounding area. Disease 
was spread by close personal 
contact and by use of 
contaminated needles and 
syringes in hospitals and clinics. 
This outbreak was the first 
recognition of the disease
Serology
1976 Sudan Ebola-Sudan 284 151 (53%) Occurred in Nzara, Maridi and 
the surrounding area. Disease 
was spread mainly through 
close personal contact within 
hospitals. Many medical care 
personnel were infected
Antibody detection by 
immunofluorescence; 
virus isolation, 
histopathology
1976 England Ebola-Sudan 1 0 (0%) Laboratory infection by 
accidental stick of contaminated 
needle
Virus isolation by 
electron microscopy
1977 Zaire Ebola-Zaire 1 1 (100%) Noted retrospectively in the 
village of Tandala
Antibody detection by 
immunofluorescence
1979 Sudan Ebola-Sudan 34 22 (65%) Occurred in Nzara, Maridi. 
Recurrent outbreak at the same 
site as the 1976 Sudan epidemic
Virus isolation; antibody 
detection by indirect 
immunofluorescence
1989 United 
States of 
America
Ebola-
Reston
0 0 (0%) Ebola-Reston virus was 
introduced into quarantine 
facilities in Virginia and 
Pennsylvania by monkeys 
imported from the Philippines
Virus isolation by 
electron microscopy
1990 United 
States of 
America
Ebola-
Reston
4 
(asymptomatic)
0 (0%) Ebola-Reston virus was 
introduced once again into 
quarantine facilities in Virginia 
and Texas by monkeys imported 
from the Philippines. Four 
humans developed antibodies 
but did not get sick
Serology: 
immunofluorescence and 
Western blot test
1989–90 Philippines Ebola-
Reston
3 
(asymptomatic)
0 (0%) High mortality among 
cynomolgus macaques in a 
primate facility responsible 
for exporting animals into the 
United States of America. Three 
workers in the animal facility 
developed antibodies but did 
not get sick
Indirect fluorescent 
antibody test; Western 
blot test
1992 Italy Ebola-
Reston
0 0 (0%) Ebola-Reston virus was 
introduced into quarantine 
facilities in Sienna by monkeys 
imported from the same export 
facility in the Philippines that 
was involved in the episodes in 
the United States of America. 
No humans were infected
Sera tests against viruses 
isolated in monkeys from 
previous outbreak in the 
Philippines
1994 Gabon Ebola-Zaire 52 31 (60%) Occurred in Mékouka and 
other gold-mining camps 
deep in the rain forest. Initially 
thought to be yellow fever; 
identified as EVD in 1995
Indirect 
immunofluorescence 
assays, IgM and IgG ELISA
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Year(s) Country
Ebola 
subtype
Reported 
number of 
human cases
Reported 
number (%) 
of deaths 
among cases
Situation
Confirmatory laboratory 
analysis
1994 Côte 
d’Ivoire
Ebola-Côte 
d’Ivoire
1 0 (0%) Scientist became ill after 
conducting an autopsy on a wild 
chimpanzee in the Taï Forest. 
The patient was treated in 
Switzerland
Immunofluorescence 
assay and electron 
microscopy
1995 DRC 
(formerly 
Zaire)
Ebola-Zaire 315 250 (81%) Occurred in Kikwit and 
surrounding area. Traced 
to index case-patient who 
worked in forest adjoining the 
city. Epidemic spread through 
families and hospitals
Ebola antibody and 
antigen ELISA, viral RNA 
RT-PCR
1996 
(Jan–
Apr)
Gabon Ebola-Zaire 37 21 (57%) Occurred in Mayibout area. 
A chimpanzee found dead in 
the forest was eaten by people 
hunting for food. Nineteen 
people who were involved in 
the slaughter of the animal 
became ill; other cases occurred 
in family members
Indirect 
immunofluorescence 
assays, IgG and IgM 
ELISAs
Jul 
1996–Jan 
1997
Gabon Ebola-Zaire 60 45 (74%) Occurred in Booué area 
with transport of patients to 
Libreville. Index case-patient 
was a hunter who lived in a 
forest camp. Disease was spread 
by close contact with infected 
persons. A dead chimpanzee 
found in the forest at the time 
was determined to be infected
Indirect 
immunofluorescence 
assays, IgG and IgM 
ELISAs
1996 South 
Africa
Ebola-Zaire 2 1 (50%) A medical professional travelled 
from Gabon to Johannesburg, 
South Africa, after having 
treated Ebola virus-infected 
patients and thus having been 
exposed to the virus. He was 
hospitalized and a nurse who 
took care of him became 
infected and died
Immunofluorescence and 
serology
1996 United 
States of 
America
Ebola-
Reston
0 0 (0%) Ebola-Reston virus was 
introduced into a quarantine 
facility in Texas by monkeys 
imported from the Philippines. 
No human infections were 
identified
Immunohistochemistry; 
sandwich ELISA, IgG and 
IgM ELISA, RT-PCR
1996 Philippines Ebola-
Reston
0 0 (0%) Ebola-Reston virus was 
identified in a monkey export 
facility in the Philippines. 
No human infections were 
identified
Antigen capture ELISA
2000–01 Uganda Ebola-Sudan 425 224 (53%) Occurred in Gulu, Masindi and 
Mbarara districts of Uganda. 
The three most important 
risks associated with Ebolavirus 
infection were attending 
funerals of EVD case-patients, 
having contact with case-
patients in one’s family and 
providing medical care to Ebola 
case-patients without using 
adequate personal protective 
measures
RT-PCR for IgG 
antibodies and Ebola 
genome
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Year(s) Country
Ebola 
subtype
Reported 
number of 
human cases
Reported 
number (%) 
of deaths 
among cases
Situation
Confirmatory laboratory 
analysis
Oct 
2001–
Mar 
2002
Gabon Ebola-Zaire 65 53 (82%) Outbreak occurred over the 
border of Gabon and the 
Republic of the Congo
Antigen detection, IgG 
antibody ELISA, RT-PCR
Oct 
2001–
Mar 
2002
Republic of 
the Congo 
Ebola-Zaire 57 43 (75%) Outbreak occurred over the 
border of Gabon and the 
Republic of the Congo. This 
was the first time that EVD was 
reported in the Republic of the 
Congo
Antigen detection, IgG 
antibody ELISA, RT-PCR
Dec 
2002–
Apr 
2003
Republic of 
the Congo
Ebola-Zaire 143 128 (89%) Outbreak occurred in the 
districts of Mbomo and Kéllé in 
Cuvette Ouest Department
IgG antibody ELISA, 
antigen detection by 
ELISA and RT-PCR
2003 
(Nov–
Dec)
Republic of 
the Congo
Ebola-Zaire 35 29 (83%) Outbreak occurred in Mbomo 
and Mbandza villages located in 
Mbomo District, Cuvette Ouest 
Department
IgG antibody ELISA, 
antigen detection by 
ELISA and RT-PCR
2004 Sudan Ebola-Sudan 17 7 (41%) Outbreak occurred in Yambio 
county of southern Sudan. 
This outbreak was concurrent 
with an outbreak of measles 
in the same area, and several 
suspected EVD cases were later 
reclassified as measles cases
Antigen ELISA, RT-PCR of 
Ebola genome
2007 DRC Ebola-Zaire 264 187 (71%) Outbreak occurred in Kasai 
Occidental Province. The 
outbreak was declared over on 
20 November. Last confirmed 
case on 4 October and last 
death on 10 October
IgG and IgM antibody 
detection and antigen 
detection by ELISA, RT-
PCR to detect genome
Dec 
2007–Jan 
2008
Uganda Ebola-
Bundibugyo
131 42 (37%) Outbreak occurred in 
Bundibugyo District in western 
Uganda. First reported 
occurrence of a new strain
Antigen capture; IgG and 
IgM ELISA
Nov 
2008
Philippines Ebola-
Reston
6 
(asymptomatic)
0 (0%) First known occurrence of 
Ebola-Reston in pigs. Strain 
closely similar to earlier strains. 
Six workers from the pig farm 
and slaughterhouse developed 
antibodies but did not become 
sick
IgG antibody detection
Dec 
2008–
Feb 
2009
DRC Ebola-Zaire 32 15 (47%) Outbreak occurred in the 
Mweka and Luebo health zones 
of Kasai Occidental Province
May 
2011
Uganda Ebola-Sudan 1 1 (100%) Single case in Luwero District, 
Uganda 
RT-PCR, antigen 
detection ELISA
Jul–Aug 
2012
Uganda Ebola-Sudan 11* 4* (36.4%) Outbreak occurred in the 
western district of Kibaale; 20 
of the patients were from the 
same family
Aug–
Nov 
2012
DRC Ebola-
Bundibugyo
36* 13* (36.1%) Outbreak occurred in 
northeastern Orientale 
Province
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Year(s) Country
Ebola 
subtype
Reported 
number of 
human cases
Reported 
number (%) 
of deaths 
among cases
Situation
Confirmatory laboratory 
analysis
Nov 
2012
Uganda Ebola-Sudan 6* 3* (50%) Outbreak occurred in the 
central district of Luwero and 
carried by an infected patient to 
the capital city, Kampala. Many 
of the patients were from the 
same family
Feb 
2014—
ongoing 
as of this 
report
Guinea, 
Liberia
New strain 
yet to be 
named at 
publication 
of this 
report
203 (ongoing as 
of this report)
129 (63.5%) 
(ongoing 
as of this 
report)
First outbreak in Guinea and 
Liberia; outbreak began in 
southern Guinea and was 
carried by infected patients 
to the capital, Conakry, and 
Liberia. Consumption of bats, 
a local delicacy, was implicated 
in starting the outbreak. First 
reported occurrence of a new 
strain
RT-PCR, virus isolation
 
*Laboratory confirmed cases. 
ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; EVD: Ebola virus disease; IgG: immunoglobulin G; IgM: immunoglobulin M; RNA: ribonucleic acid; RT-PCR: real time 
polymerase chain reaction.
Source: CDC (2009a). 
As journal articles are published from the more recent EVD outbreaks, laboratory analysis used to confirm the 
outbreaks should become available.
Summary of outbreaks in Uganda
Table 3 presents a summary of EVD outbreaks in Uganda. While many of the outbreaks in Uganda were caused by 
the Sudan strain, in 2007 a new strain of Ebolavirus, Bundibugyo, was discovered. This new strain was named after the 
region where the outbreak occurred.
Table 3. Known cases and outbreaks of EVD in Uganda in chronological order 
Year(s) Ebola subtype
Reported 
number 
of human 
cases
Reported 
number (%) 
of deaths 
among cases
Situation
Confirmatory 
laboratory analysis
2000–01 Ebola-Sudan 425 224 (53%) Occurred in Gulu, Masindi and Mbarara districts of 
Uganda. The three most important risks associated 
with Ebola virus infection were attending funerals 
of Ebola virus disease case-patients, having contact 
with case-patients in one’s family and providing 
medical care to Ebola case-patients without using 
adequate personal protective measures
RT-PCR for IgG 
antibodies and Ebola 
genome
Dec 2007–
Jan 2008
Ebola-
Bundibugyo
131 42 (37%) Outbreak occurred in Bundibugyo District in 
western Uganda. First reported occurrence of a 
new strain
Antigen capture; IgG 
and IgM ELISA
May 2011 Ebola-Sudan 1 1 (100%) Single case in Luwero District, Uganda RT-PCR, antigen 
detection ELISA
July–Aug 
2012
Ebola-Sudan 24 17 (71%) Outbreak occurred in the western district of 
Kibaale; 20 of the patients were from the same 
family
Nov 2012 Ebola-Sudan 7 4 (57%) Outbreak occurred in the central district of 
Luwero and carried by an infected patient to the 
capital city, Kampala; many of the patients were 
from the same family
ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; IgG: immunoglobulin G; IgM: immunoglobulin M; RT-PCR: real time polymerase chain reaction. 
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Figure 3. Incidence and mortality of EVD outbreaks in Uganda.
From Figure 3, it is clear that the frequency of EVD outbreaks is increasing in Uganda.
Significance
The significance of EVD cannot be overstated. Although the incidence of EVD may be low compared to other 
infectious diseases in Africa, its high index of illness severity together with the profound human suffering and agonizing 
death (Bruce and Brysiewicz 2002) triggers public panic nationally and globally. 
Ebolavirus is highly pathogenic to human and nonhuman primates, with lethality rates of up to 90% for humans and no 
current pre- and post-exposure treatment options. The emergence and re-emergence in epidemic regions of Africa, 
the potential for introductions into non-endemic countries through international travel and the global trade in wildlife 
and the possible use as a bioweapon make Ebolavirus a worldwide public health concern. The recently reported decline 
of Central African wildlife, particularly the great apes, has further extended the threats posed by this virus to include 
fear of extinguishing one of the world’s largest populations of gorillas and chimpanzees (Feldmann et al. 2004; Groseth 
et al. 2007).
In addition to the risk to human and animal health, the public fear and stigma associated with EVD cannot be 
overstated. Retrospective analysis of media reports found that responses to an EVD outbreak can be very dramatic, 
disproportionate to the actual danger present. Responses included confusion, anger, serious stigma in affected 
communities, medical staff working themselves to exhaustion, medical staff quitting their posts, patients fleeing from 
hospitals, calls to spiritual forces for protection against infection, imposition of some international travel restrictions 
and a coordinated national control strategy (Kinsman 2012).
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Spatial distribution
Zaire ebolavirus, Sudan ebolavirus, Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus and Bundibugyo ebolavirus are endemic in several countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The pattern of outbreaks seems to suggest they each may have a distinct geographic range (Figure 
4). Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus has been reported only in West Africa, while Sudan ebolavirus tends to occur in eastern 
Africa (Sudan and Uganda) and Zaire ebolavirus has been seen mainly in the west-central region of Africa (DRC, Gabon 
and Republic of the Congo). Bundibugyo ebolavirus was reported from two outbreaks: one in Uganda and the other in 
DRC (The Center for Food Security and Public Health 2009).
Source: CDC (2012b).
However, recent serological surveys suggest that some of these strains may be more widespread. Antibodies to Zaire 
ebolavirus have been found in nonhuman primates and bats in much of central Africa. Seropositive animals were found 
in some countries, such as Cameroon, where outbreaks of EVD have never been reported (Becker et al. 1992; The 
Center for Food Security and Public Health 2009).
Ecology
Although Ebolavirus emerged more than three decades ago, the reservoirs of this zoonotic pathogen and the routes 
of primary transmission to humans and nonhuman primates remain inconclusive. Recent outbreaks have been 
associated with multiple introductions into the population, indicating the circulation of distinct strains that have 
evolved in reservoir species that occupy different ecological niches (Feldmann et al. 2004). Considering the restricted 
geographical region in which EVD is found and the tremendous efforts invested over the past three decades to identify 
a reservoir, it seems probable that whatever the reservoir, it is rarely encountered and/or transmission is inefficient or 
perhaps regulated by specific conditions (Groseth et al. 2007). Figure 5 shows a pictorial representation of Ebolavirus 
ecology.
Figure 4. Geographic distribution of EVD outbreaks in sub-Saharan Africa, 1979–2008.
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Figure 5. Ebolavirus ecology. 
Source: Rousseau (2010).
Bats
Anecdotal evidence has linked contact with bats to Ebolavirus infection. For instance, in the 1976 outbreak of Sudan 
ebolavirus, the first six human cases were cotton factory employees who worked in a room where bats roosted. In 
1994 in Côte d’Ivoire, chimpanzees which developed EVD had been feeding in a fig tree together with fruit bats for 
two weeks before developing the disease. The 1989–90 and 1996 Reston ebolavirus outbreaks in primate facilities 
were linked back to a single export facility in the Philippines which was a former fruit orchard where animals were 
potentially exposed to fruit bats (Rousseau 2010). Additionally, the first human victim in the 2007 Zaire ebolavirus 
outbreak in DRC was linked to direct exposure to freshly killed bats bought from hunters (Leroy et al. 2009).
Antibodies to Ebolavirus have been found in several fruit bat species in Ghana: African straw coloured fruit bat (Eidolon 
helvum), Franquet’s epauletted fruit bat (Epomops franqueti), Gambian epauletted fruit bat (Epomophorus gambianus), 
Hammer-headed fruit bat (Hypsignathus monstrosus) and Veldkamp’s bat (Nanonycteris veldkampii) (Hayman et al. 
2012). However, serology and virus isolation carried out on 539 bats captured during the 1995 Kikwit Zaire ebolavirus 
outbreak were all negative for antibodies and virus isolation was unsuccessful (Leirs et al. 1999). Experimental 
infection of captured bats in and around the 1995 Kikwit Zaire ebolavirus outbreak found that several species 
supported replication and circulation of high titres of virus: Angola free-tailed bat (Tadarida condylura), Wahlberg’s 
epauletted fruit bat (Epomophorus wahlbergi) and little free-tailed bat (Tadarida pumila). Furthermore, virus was 
recovered from faecal samples 21 days post-inoculation (Swanepoel et al. 1996).
During the Zaire ebolavirus outbreaks that occurred between 2001 and 2003 in DRC and Gabon, numerous animals 
were captured in the search for reservoir species, including 222 birds, 129 small terrestrial vertebrates and 679 bats. 
Of the 1024 small mammals sampled, Ebolavirus specific antibodies were detected in the serum of 16 (8%) of 192 fruit 
bats belonging to three species: H. monstrosus, E. franqueti and M. torquata. Ebolavirus RNA was detected in pooled 
liver and spleen samples from 13 (5%) of 279 such bats (Leroy et al. 2005). A large-scale serological survey of bats 
belonging to these three species was then conducted, with 1390 specimens captured between 2003 and 2006 in three 
regions of Gabon and in the epidemic border region with DRC. The prevalence of Ebolavirus specific immunoglobulin 
G (IgG) was about 5% in bats from all four regions (Pourrut et al. 2009). Antibodies to Zaire ebolavirus were found in 
six bat species captured: E. franqueti, H. monstrosus, M. torquata, Micropteropus pusillus, Mops condylurus and Rousettus 
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aegyptiacus. Zaire ebolavirus RNA was isolated from three of these species: E. franqueti, H. monstrosus and M. torquata 
(Pourrut et al. 2009) but the extent to which Ebolavirus causes disease in these species is still not known.
In the Greater Accra Region of Ghana, fruit bats have also been found to be positive for IgG antibody to Zaire 
ebolavirus. E. franqueti, Epomops gambianus, H. monstrosus and N. veldkampii all had IgG Ebolavirus specific antibody 
(Hayman et al. 2012).
In Uganda, Ebolavirus antibody has also been found in Epomophorus labiatus, R. aegyptiacus and Eidolon helvum (Reed 
2012; Shoemaker 2013). In addition to these bat species, E. franqueti, E. gambianus, E. wahlbergi, H. monstrosus and 
M. torquata can all be found in Uganda and have all been found infected with either Ebolavirus or Ebolavirus specific 
antibodies. 
Figure 6. Geographic range of E. franqueti. 
Source: Mickleburgh et al. (2008c).
Figure 7. Geographic range of E. helvum.
Source: Mickleburgh et al. (2013).
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Figure 8. Geographic range of E. gambianus. 
Source: Mickleburgh et al. (2008f).
Figure 9. Geographic range of E. labiatus.
Source: Mickleburgh et al. (2008a).
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Figure 10. Geographic range of E. wahlbergi.
Source: Mickleburgh et al. (2008b).
Figure 11. Geographic range of H. monstrosus.
Source: Mickleburgh et al. (2008d).
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Figure 12. Geographic range of M. torquata.
Source: Mickleburgh et al. (2008e).
Figure 13. Geographic range of R. aegyptiacus.
Source: Benda et al. (2008). 
From the maps in Figures 6 to 13, it is clear that many of the bat species found with either Ebolavirus or circulating 
antibodies are found in Uganda. The many different species and habitats make it a challenge to identify best-bet 
interventions for controlling bat-pig contact.
If we assume, as now seems likely, that bats have a role as a reservoir species for Ebolavirus, it will be important to 
examine the role that seasonal, environmental or temporal physiological factors (for example, pregnancy or other 
stresses) have in facilitating virus replication and subsequent transmission to other susceptible hosts (Groseth et al. 
2007). While bats have been presumptively considered the natural reservoirs of Ebolavirus, it is interesting to note that 
there are many human cases of EVD that cannot be directly linked to contact with bats.
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Nonhuman primates and other wildlife
Although in many outbreaks the source of infection for the human index case was not identified, many have had 
documented contact with nonhuman primates known to be susceptible to Ebolavirus infection (gorillas, chimpanzees 
and duikers). Nonhuman primates are believed to be infected directly from the natural reservoir. Subsequently, 
the virus circulates or spreads by horizontal transmission (for example, ape to ape) within a primate population. 
Transmission can take place after direct contact with infected blood, secretions or excretions. Transmission is also 
possible through contact with contaminated inanimate objects or vegetation (Feldmann et al. 2004).
The epizootics caused by Reston ebolavirus, the only Ebolavirus of Asian origin, have raised the possibility that 
nonhuman primates might be a reservoir. This appears to be unlikely, at least for the Ebolavirus of African origins, 
which are highly pathogenic to nonhuman primates—a feature that is generally incongruous with the concept of a 
reservoir host. If not the reservoir, nonhuman primates could be indicator hosts for Ebolavirus circulation. This is 
supported by deaths in monkey species that occurred before human cases, as described in the outbreak of Côte d’Ivoire 
ebolavirus in the Taï Forest, several of the Ebolavirus outbreaks occurring after 1996 in Gabon and the recent outbreak 
of Ebolavirus in DRC (Feldmann et al. 2004; Leroy et al. 2004).
In a study designed to test animal mortality in regions of EVD in Gabon, 14 of the 34 animal carcasses found tested 
positive for Zaire ebolavirus RNA (10 gorillas, 3 chimpanzees and 1 duiker) (Groseth et al. 2007; Lahm et al. 2007).
Increased mortality as a result of Zaire ebolavirus in susceptible great apes at the end of the rainy season and/or the 
start of the dry season has previously been observed. Thus, it has been widely hypothesized that these seasonal 
changes might force different animal species into closer proximity. The dry season from November to February is in 
fact a time of high fruit abundance in Gabon, suggesting that increased interaction between the relevant species during 
feeding and/or altered dietary preference during these times might also have a role in spillover (Groseth et al. 2007).
Suggested modes of transmission between fruit bats and nonhuman primates include competition for fruit between 
fruit bats and nonhuman primates leading to spatiotemporal clustering of these frugivorous animals creating an 
increased likelihood of spillover (Rousseau 2010).
Detection of Zaire ebolavirus RNA in organ tissues of rodents and shrews captured in the Central African Republic 
suggested that a reservoir exists within small terrestrial mammals living in peripheral forest areas (Feldmann et 
al. 2004; Gonzalez et al. 2007). However, other ecological studies of captured rodents have found no evidence of 
Ebolavirus by serology and attempts at virus isolation have been unsuccessful (Swanepoel et al. 1996; Leirs et al. 1999). 
Experimental Ebolavirus infections in newborn mice and guinea pigs have been successful (The Center for Food 
Security and Public Health 2009), but the results have not been confirmed by other research. Likewise, attempts to 
experimentally infect plants (Swanepoel et al. 1996) and isolate virus from arthropods (Reiter et al. 1999) have been 
unsuccessful.
Domestic livestock
Due to the number of human cases of EVD in previous outbreaks with no known contact with nonhuman primates 
or bats, there has been speculation that other reservoirs of infection cause spillover into human populations. Table 4 
lists the source of infection for confirmed EVD cases. In the 1976 outbreak in Sudan, 14 (4.9%) of the 284 cases and 
55 (17.4%) of the 315 cases during the 1995 outbreak in Kikwit, DRC had no direct physical contact with an infected 
person or known infected carcass (Roels et al. 1999; Allela et al. 2005). The source of infection remained unknown for 
12 case-patients in the August 2000–January 2001 Sudan ebolavirus outbreak in Uganda (Francesconi et al. 2003).
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Table 4. Source of infection for confirmed EVD cases 
Virus strain Year Location Source of infection Number of cases Case fatality rate (%)
Zaire 1976 Zaire Unknown 318 88
1977 Zaire Unknown 1 100
1994 Gabon Contact with NHPs 49 65
1995 DRC Unknown 315 88
1996 Gabon Contact with NHPs 37 57
1996 Gabon Contact with NHPs 60 75
2001 Gabon/DRC Contact with NHPs 123 79
2003 DRC Contact with NHPs 143 90
2003 DRC Contact with NHPs 35 83
2004 Russia Lab accident 1 100
2005 DRC Unknown 12 75
2007 DRC Contact with bats 264 71
2008 DRC Unknown 32 47
Sudan 1976 Sudan Unknown 284 53
1976 England Lab accident 1 0
1979 Sudan Unknown 43 65
2000 Uganda Unknown 425 53
2004 Sudan Unknown 17 42
Côte d’Ivoire 1994 Côte d’Ivoire Necropsy of chimp 1 0
Bundibugyo 2007 Uganda Unknown 102 42
 
NHPs: nonhuman primates.
Source: Kortepeter et al. (2011).
These cases resulting from unknown sources of infection have led to searches for Ebolavirus reservoirs in species 
beyond fruit bats and nonhuman primates. At present, pigs are the only livestock species found naturally infected with 
Reston ebolavirus (FAO and EMPRES 2008; CDC 2009b). Of 141 tested humans, six individuals who worked on pig 
farms or with swine products had positive serum IgG titres to Reston ebolavirus, confirming the potential transmission 
between pigs and humans (Barrette et al. 2009). One theory suggests that fruit bats dropped partially eaten fruit 
into the areas where pigs scavenge for food. Pigs then ingested the contaminated fruit, serving as amplifying hosts, 
transmitting Ebolavirus to humans through direct contact.
Experimental infection of pigs with Zaire ebolavirus has also been successful. In this study, naïve pigs reared in contact 
with the infected pigs become infected, suggesting transmission via direct contact, probably through aerosols as virus 
was isolated from lung tissue in the experimentally infected pigs (Kobinger et al. 2011).
Finally, dogs in Ghana were also found to be seropositive to Ebolavirus with no clinical symptoms observed (Allela et 
al. 2005). Perhaps dogs could serve as sentinels for Ebolavirus circulation, as in many communities throughout Africa, 
including Uganda, they typically roam free and scavenge for their own food like bushmeat and slaughter waste.
Humans
It is clear that once humans become infected, subsequent Ebolavirus transmission is continued from person to person. 
After the first case patient in an outbreak setting is infected, the virus can be transmitted in several ways. People can 
be exposed to Ebolavirus from direct contact with the blood and/or secretions of an infected person. Thus, the virus 
is often spread through families and friends because they come in close contact with such secretions when caring for 
infected persons. People can also be exposed to Ebolavirus through contact with objects, such as needles, that have 
been contaminated with infected secretions. 
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Large outbreaks of EVD are usually driven by person-to-person contact. Virus has been detected in saliva, stool, 
semen, breast milk, tears, nasal blood and skin swabs during the acute phase of illness (Bausch et al. 2007). In 
particular, Ebolavirus was frequently found in saliva in the early course of disease. Hence, intimate contact and the 
sharing of food, particularly eating with the hands from a common plate, a custom common in many parts of Africa, 
could be possible transmission routes from person to person. Additionally, the presence of Ebolavirus in breast milk 
suggests the possibility of direct mother-to-child transmission via breastfeeding. Finally, the isolation of Ebolavirus in 
semen 40 days after the onset of illness underscores the risk of sexual transmission of during convalescence (Bausch 
et al. 2007). 
Nosocomial transmission refers to the spread of a disease within a healthcare setting, such as a clinic or hospital. 
Nosocomial transmission occurs frequently during EVD outbreaks. In African healthcare facilities, patients are often 
cared for without the use of a mask, gown or gloves. Exposure to the virus has occurred when healthcare workers 
treated infected individuals without wearing these types of protective clothing. In addition, when needles or syringes 
are used, they may not be of the disposable type or may not have been sterilized but only rinsed before reinsertion 
into multi-use vials of medicine. If needles or syringes become contaminated with virus and are then reused, numerous 
people can become infected. Nosocomial transmission becomes more of a factor when there are low hygiene 
standards and poor healthcare practices, such as reusing syringes and needles and the lack of protective clothing 
(CDC 2009a). Environmental contamination and transmission via fomites in an isolation ward was low as long as 
recommended infection control guidelines were followed (Bausch et al. 2007).
In addition to communal meals, washing of the deceased and hand washing, rituals common at the funerals, have also 
been found to be significant in the transmission of Ebolavirus. Ritual hand washing requires funeral goers to share a 
bowl of water that symbolizes unity with the dead and ancestral spirits (Bruce and Brysiewicz 2002). 
During the Sudan ebolavirus outbreak in Uganda from August 2000 to January 2001, the introduction of the virus 
into the human community via one infected person was followed by dissemination by person-to-person transmission 
within medical facilities. Epidemiological investigations identified the three most important means of transmission as 
attending funerals of presumptive EVD case patients where ritual contact with the deceased occurred, and intrafamilial 
and nosocomial transmission. Fourteen (64%) of the 22 healthcare workers in Gulu were infected after establishing 
isolation wards. Two distance focal outbreaks were initiated by movement of infected contacts of EVD cases from 
Gulu to Mbarara and Masindi districts (CDC 2001).
Clinical symptoms, diagnosis and treatment
In humans
Infections with Ebolavirus are typically acute. There is no carrier state. There have been reports of asymptomatic 
Ebolavirus infection (Leroy et al. 2000; Leroy et al. 2001) but these reports are rare. The different species of Ebolavirus 
seem to cause somewhat different clinical syndromes, but opportunities for close observation of the diseases under 
good conditions have been rare. Figure 14 illustrates a model of Ebolavirus pathogenesis in humans. Generally, 
following an incubation period of 2–21 days, the onset of EVD is insidious with symptoms resembling a cold or 
influenza. However, within a few hours, the body temperature rises rapidly causing the victim to sweat and shiver 
uncontrollably, symptoms often associated with malaria, brucellosis and yellow fever. Within 48 hours, any movement 
of the eyes, jaws or head causes pain. Subsequently, haemorrhage from every orifice, including the victim’s eyes and 
ears, manifests not only as a definitive sign of the disease but also of impending death (Bruce and Brysiewicz 2002). 
Patients with fatal disease develop clinical signs early during infection and die typically between day 6 and 16 with 
hypovolaemic shock and multiorgan failure. Haemorrhages can be severe but are only present in fewer than half 
of patients. In nonfatal cases, patients have fever for several days and improve typically around day 6–11, about the 
time that the humoral antibody response is noted. Convalescence is extended, often resulting in myelitis, recurrent 
hepatitis, psychosis or uveitis. Pregnant women have an increased risk of miscarriage (Feldmann and Geisbert 2011).
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Figure 14. Model of Ebolavirus pathogenesis in humans.
 
Source: Feldmann and Geisbert (2011).
There has been little research into asymptomatic infection in humans. Ebolavirus infections without apparent 
disease were common among residents of the Central African Republic. Of 962 serum samples screened using an 
immunofluorescent antibody test, 561 (58.8%) were positive to either Zaire ebolavirus or Sudan ebolavirus (Johnson et 
al. 1993). During the 1996 Zaire ebolavirus outbreak in Gabon, there were asymptomatic infections in close contacts 
of symptomatic cases (Leroy et al. 2000; Leroy et al. 2001). Finally, as noted above, during the EVD outbreak in pigs in 
the Philippines and in monkey handlers in the United States of America, asymptomatic infection in the animal handlers 
was noted by seroconversion. 
Diagnosing EVD in an individual who has been infected only a few days previously is difficult because early symptoms, 
such as red eyes and a skin rash, are nonspecific to the virus and are seen in other patients with diseases that occur 
much more frequently. However, if a person has the constellation of symptoms described above and infection with 
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Ebolavirus is suspected, isolation of the patient and notification of the relevant authorities is the recommended first 
course of action (CDC 2009a). The WHO has a handbook, Viral haemorrhagic fever infection control in the African 
healthcare setting, that outlines standard precautions with all patients, identifying suspect cases, isolating patients, 
wearing protective clothing, disinfecting reusable supplies and equipment, safe disposal of waste, safe burial practices, 
mobilizing community resources and conducting community education (WHO et al. 1998).
There is no standard treatment for EVD, just supportive therapy. This consists of balancing the patient’s fluids and 
electrolytes, maintaining their oxygen status and blood pressure and treating them for any complicating infections 
(CDC 2009a).
Antigen-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), Immunoglobulin M (IgM) ELISA, polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) and virus isolation can be used to diagnose a case of EVD within a few days of the onset of symptoms. 
Persons tested later in the course of the disease or after recovery can be tested for IgM and IgG antibodies. The 
disease can also be diagnosed retrospectively in deceased patients by using immunohistochemistry testing, virus 
isolation or PCR (CDC 2009a).
In nonhuman primates
Ebolavirus infections have been intensively investigated in various species of nonhuman primates, but mainly in 
cynomolgus (Macaca fascicularis) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). African green monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops) 
are resistant to Ebolavirus and baboons (Papio hamadryas) appear to be somewhat resistant to Ebolavirus. The viral dose 
and strain, the route of infection and the species of nonhuman primates infected all appear to influence the onset, 
duration and severity of the clinical signs.
For cynomolgus macaques infected with Ebolavirus, the onset of clinical signs is fairly rapid, occurring within 4–5 
days. In other nonhuman primate models, the onset of symptoms is slower and thus more similar to that observed 
in humans. Usually macaques become febrile and lethargic 2–3 days after infection and fever persists throughout 
the course of the disease. A drop in body temperature usually precedes death. Animals also show weight loss of 
up to 10% of their body weight, which is probably primarily related to dehydration rather than mobilization of fat 
reserves and catabolism, although all of these factors probably contribute. In addition, some animals develop diarrhoea 
and intermittent bloody stool. As soon as the fourth day after infection, nonhuman primates generally develop a 
maculopapular rash that remains prominent until death (Bente et al. 2009).
Only a few studies have evaluated the pathogenesis of Sudan ebolavirus in nonhuman primates. In rhesus and 
cynomolgus macaques, Sudan ebolavirus disease course appears to be several days slower than that seen following Zaire 
ebolavirus infection and rates of survival appear to be higher (Bente et al. 2009).
At present, diagnosis and treatment in nonhuman primates is similar to that in humans. However, given that 
nonhuman primates are typically found dead in the forest from EVD, control and prevention measures have not 
been attempted in wildlife. Until a suitable vaccine is available, protection of wild nonhuman primates from Ebolavirus 
infection, particularly in vulnerable great ape populations, will remain elusive. At present, Uganda does not have a plan 
in place to protect the critically endangered mountain gorillas, a source of significant tourism revenue, from an EVD 
outbreak (P. Atimnedi, personal communication, 23 July 2013).
In pigs
Reston ebolavirus was accidentally discovered in pigs while investigating a particularly pathogenic porcine reproductive 
and respiratory syndrome virus outbreak, a respiratory and abortion disease syndrome in swine. Symptoms included 
a high fever of 41°C, laboured breathing, thumping, coughing, nasal discharge, loss of appetite, diarrhoea, skin 
haemorrhage and reddish discolouration, with some pigs found in recumbent position. High nursery house and 
growing house mortalities were observed. Additionally, sows had previously been affected by high fever and abortions 
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(Rousseau 2010). A panviral microarray, PCR, Ebola-specific real time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), ELISA, 
immunochemistry and virus isolation were used to confirm Reston ebolavirus in this outbreak (Barrette et al. 2009).
During experimental infection of pigs with Zaire ebolavirus, laboured breathing with an abdominal component, loss 
of interest in human presence, loss of appetite, reluctance to stand up and move and lack of interactions and play 
behaviour with cage mates were all observed. RT-PCR, histology, virus isolation and ELISA were all used to diagnose 
Zaire ebolavirus (Kobinger et al. 2011).
Measures to prevent infection of swine with Reston ebolavirus have not yet been established, but normal biosecurity 
measures, including quarantine of suspected animals and prevention of contact with bats and nonhuman primates, are 
appropriate. Eradication procedures, including quarantine, testing and culling, have been established in infected pigs 
and exports were suspended from affected areas (The Center for Food Security and Public Health 2009).
Case-fatality rates of EVD
The case-fatality rate of EVD has varied between outbreaks, ranging from 25–100%. Infections with Zaire ebolavirus 
have the highest case-fatality rates (60–100%) followed by those with Sudan ebolavirus (40–100%). On the basis of 
two outbreaks, case-fatality rates for Bundibugyo ebolavirus are estimated to be 25–55%. The current outbreak of 
Ebolavirus in Guinea and Liberia, with a strain that has yet to be named, has a case-fatality rate of 63.5% at the time of 
this report. The only reported person infected with Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus became ill but survived. Reston ebolavirus is 
deemed non-pathogenic to humans, but laboratory tests have documented the occurrence of infection. 
By comparison, case-fatality rates for Marburg virus in Africa are 70–85% but were much lower in the outbreak in 
Europe in 1967 which had a case-fatality rate of only 22%. This low case-fatality rate has led to speculation that proper 
intensive care with supportive therapy would increase the survival rate of infected patients. This hypothesis is hard to 
test because of austere field conditions and ethical dilemmas about not providing care to some patients (Feldmann and 
Geisbert 2011).
Prevalence and incidence data
Confirmed cases of EVD have been reported in Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, the Republic of the 
Congo, Sudan and Uganda. No outbreaks of EVD in humans have ever been reported anywhere outside of Africa. 
Reston ebolavirus caused severe illness and death in monkeys imported to research facilities in Italy and the United 
States of America from the Philippines; during these outbreaks, several research workers became infected with the 
virus but did not become ill.
EVD typically appears in sporadic outbreaks, usually spread within a healthcare setting, a situation known as 
amplification. It is likely that sporadic, isolated cases occur as well but go unrecognized (CDC 2009a).
Therapy and vaccine research
Several therapies and vaccines are under investigation in rodent and nonhuman primate models. In view of the severe 
and rapid progression of EVD, no single therapy is likely to be sufficiently potent. Presently, the most promising 
strategy is to slow down virus replication and disease progression in order to allow the adaptive and innate immune 
responses to overcome infection (Feldmann and Geisbert 2011). A combination of therapies may be the best option 
(Table 5), something that makes application in rural African healthcare settings difficult where lack of cold storage, 
inadequately trained healthcare staff and inconsistent stocks of pharmaceuticals are routine occurrences.
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Table 5. Treatment and prophylaxis of EVD 
Approach Success in animals Issues and concerns
Treatment approach  
Antibody therapy Efficacy in rodents but not in 
non-human primates
Escape mutants; genetic variability; 
antibody-dependent enhancement of 
infection
Antisense oligonucleotides
Phosphorodiamidate morpholino 
oligonucleotides
Efficacy in rodents and 
non-human primates (latter 
prophylactic only)
Genetic variation; delivery
Small interfering RNAs Efficacy in rodents and non-
human primates
Genetic variation; delivery
Inflammatory modulators
Type 1 interferons Efficacy in rodents but not in 
non-human primates
Manipulation of immune system
S-adenosylhomocysteine hydrolase inhibitors Efficacy in rodents but not in 
non-human primates
Manipulation of immune system
Coagulation modulators
Heparin sulphate Efficacy in humans 
questionable; not tested in 
animals
Manipulation of coagulation
Tissue factor pathway inhibitors Not tested in rodents; partial 
protection in non-human 
primates
Manipulation of coagulation
Activated protein C Not tested in rodents; partial 
protection in non-human 
primates
Manipulation of coagulation
Vaccination approach
Post-exposure vaccination
Vesicular stomatitis virus Efficacy in rodents and non-
human primates
Efficacy dependent on filovirus 
species and time of treatment start
Post-exposure vaccination
Adenovirus type 5 Efficacy in rodents and non-
human primates; one dose; 
clinical trials
Pre-existing immunity; high dose
Human parainfluenza virus type 3 Efficacy in rodents and non-
human primates; two doses 
needed for non-human 
primates
Pre-existing immunity; safety 
(replication-competent)
Vesicular stomatitis virus Efficacy in rodents and non-
human primates; one dose
Safety (replication-competent)
Virus-like particles Efficacy in rodents and non-
human primates; three doses 
needed for non-human 
primates
Boost immunization needed; 
production
Recombinant Ebolavirus without VP35 Efficacy in rodents Safety
 
Source: Feldmann and Geisbert (2011). 
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Exposure assessment
The exact origin, locations and natural habitat of Ebolavirus remain unknown. However, on the basis of available 
evidence and the nature of similar viruses, researchers believe that the virus is zoonotic with five of the six subtypes 
occurring in an animal host native to Africa. A similar host, most likely in the Philippines, is probably associated with 
Reston ebolavirus, which was isolated from infected cynomolgus monkeys that were imported to Italy and the United 
States of America from the Philippines. The virus is not known to be native to other continents (CDC 2009b).
Where information is available, it has frequently been observed that EVD index patients tend to be individuals whose 
work takes them into forests, caves or mines. In particular, several outbreaks have been traced back to hunters who 
had contact with infected wildlife. Furthermore, although it remains unclear what role direct human infection from 
bats might have in the initiation of outbreaks, studies of human behaviour as an indicator for Ebolavirus seropositivity 
in Cameroon have associated an increased risk of Ebolavirus infection with the consumption of bats and with logging 
activities. However, because for many index cases other causes (for example, contact with infected animal carcasses) 
have clearly contributed to infection, it is unclear to what extent these activities will actually have a role or if there are 
regional differences that affect local risk factors. Complicating our understanding of natural transmission are several 
seroepidemiological reports indicating high levels of seroprevalence in many areas of Africa in which notable disease 
is absent. Although these data are often used to suggest that Ebolavirus might be endemic in many areas of Africa, they 
could also suggest that, despite the usual association of Ebolavirus infection with high case-fatality rates, there might 
be co-circulation of antigenically cross-reactive but non-pathogenic Ebolavirus species, other related pathogens and/
or mechanisms of resistance in humans that are currently not understood. It should be noted that earlier studies 
(in particular those before 1995) used approaches for serological detection that are subject to cross-reactivity, thus 
infection with Ebolavirus in these populations should be confirmed using newer and more reliable approaches before 
firm conclusions can be drawn (Groseth et al. 2007).
There are currently two theories to explain the transmission of Ebolavirus among susceptible hosts in nature. The first 
suggests that, as with many classical viral zoonotic pathogens, the virus has been maintained in endemic regions within 
a reservoir host and its episodic emergence has occurred owing to infrequent contact between the reservoir(s) and 
humans or nonhuman primates.
However, an alternative mechanism of spread has been proposed, whereby the virus has been more recently 
introduced into susceptible populations and spread in a wave-like fashion to each outbreak site through an undefined 
reservoir host.
Ebolavirus outbreaks are spreading into new regions either at the front of an advancing wave or in a series of jumps 
to each new location. With the evidence of viral genome stability within an individual outbreak coupled with the 
observation of multiple strains of Ebolavirus occurring in a single outbreak, as seen in the Gabon/Republic of Congo 
outbreak in 2001 with 2–3% variation, it seems likely that some outbreaks may have more diverse origins than 
originally thought. Likewise, a pattern of multiple, parallel introductions of Reston ebolavirus in swine in the Philippines 
in 2008 lends credence to the observation that multiple individual introductions of unique viruses originating from a 
viral reservoir may be an integral part of the viral transmission cycle (Barrette et al. 2011).
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Similarly, some scientists believe that the genetic differences between Ebolavirus strains isolated from humans and 
apes during outbreaks suggest that apes are infected through multiple independent transmissions from the reservoir 
as opposed to a single outbreak directionally spreading through adjacent regions. Evidence of up to eight different 
strains circulating in humans and apes between 2001 and 2003 during outbreaks in Gabon and the Republic of Congo 
supports this theory. These were all associated with separate introductions into the human population following 
contact with infected animal carcasses and might, therefore, support the hypothesis of long-term maintenance and 
evolution of the virus in a reservoir species in an endemic area (Groseth et al. 2007).
Possible transmission routes if fruit bats are involved
There are some proposed mechanisms of Ebolavirus transmission to wildlife, domestic animals or humans from fruit 
bats:
•	 competition for fruit between bats and nonhuman primates leads to spatiotemporal clustering of frugivorous 
animals leading to an increased likelihood of spillover; or
•	 contact with infectious virus in saliva, faeces (guano), urine or birthing fluids such as blood and placental tissues 
(Rousseau 2010).
Given that the eight fruit bat species (E. franqueti, E. helvum, E. gambianus, E. labiatus, E. wahlbergi, H. monstrosus, 
M. torquata and R. aegyptiacus) assumed to be reservoirs of Ebolavirus are widely distributed across Uganda, the 
geographic range of these fruit bat species puts humans and susceptible wildlife and domestic livestock species at 
risk of direct contact with bats, their body fluids and shared fruit feeding sites. For instance, Kitaka mine in western 
Uganda is home to approximately 112,000 fruit bats. Research has shown that approximately 5000 bats could be 
infected at one time through horizontal transmission of Ebolavirus from pregnant female bats to their young (Groseth 
et al. 2007; Rousseau 2010). This large number of infected fruit bats in a geographically specific area places the 
livestock and people living in that area at risk of spillover through direct contact with dropped fruit and excretions 
from the large number of infected bats.
At present, the studies carried out on captured fruit bats or experimentally infected fruit bats have focused on 
serology and virus isolation from blood, tissues and body excretions. To date there have been no studies quantifying 
the risk of Ebolavirus infection from bat secretions and body fluids. It is notable that Ebolavirus was found to be shed in 
the faeces of experimentally infected fruit bats for up to three weeks (Swanepoel et al. 1996).
Considering the habitat overlap between pigs and bats, pigs may play a role as intermediary hosts, even amplifying the 
virus. Furthermore, assuming that bats are the reservoir for all species of Ebolavirus, and considering the long range 
migratory habits of some species, the area at risk for both human and animal infection could be vast. An example 
of this is the serologic evidence of Ebolavirus infection in bats caught in Ghana, hundreds of miles from the nearest 
reported human case (Bausch 2011).
Virus has been detected in human saliva, stool, semen, breast milk, tears, nasal blood and skin swabs during the acute 
phase of illness (Bausch et al. 2007). One could extrapolate that there is the possibility of the same being true in bat 
excretions and body fluids with virus titres high enough to be infective. This is an area of research that still needs 
elucidation.
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Possible transmission routes if pigs are involved
During the Reston ebolavirus outbreak in pigs in the Philippines, the transmission cycle was hypothesized visually as 
shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Hypothesis of transmission of Reston ebolavirus.
Source: Rousseau (2010). 
If pigs are involved in the transmission of Ebolavirus, possible routes include the following:
1. Direct contact with infected pigs by humans through daily care, butchering or hunting. Also, sick pigs are typically 
the first to be sold by farmers in Uganda (C. Masembe, personal communication, 18 April 2013). Additionally, 
rumours of outbreaks in communities cause pig farmers to sell off their stock. Both of these practices in Uganda 
increase the risk of spreading Ebolavirus to humans and other pig farms. In an ongoing African swine fever 
(ASF) project at Makerere University, it was shown that sick pigs and contact pigs were sold to other farmers, 
some of them transported 500 kilometres over several district borders within Uganda (C. Masembe, personal 
communication, 18 April 2013). The chance of these transported infected pigs and the pigs they had come in 
contact with expanding the geographic range of Ebolavirus outbreaks or creating secondary outbreaks would be 
quite high, given the large distance over which pigs are transported in Uganda. 
2. Spread between wild and domestic pigs, potentially amplifying Ebolavirus. Uganda is the natural habitat for several 
widespread wild pig species: giant forest hogs (Hylochoerus meinerthageni), Red River hogs (Potamochoerus porcus), 
bushpigs (Potamochoerus larvatus) and common warthogs (Phacochoerus africanus). Bushpigs in particular have 
a wide distribution throughout East Africa, where they live and move at the interface of national parks and 
farmland. This interaction increases pathogen sharing between wild and domestic pigs (Blomström et al. 2012). 
Personal communication with Charles Masembe confirms that there is phenotype evidence of breeding between 
wild and domestic pigs (C. Masembe, personal communication, 18 April 2013). Additionally, given the different 
production systems of pig rearing in Uganda, including tethering and free range, there is contact between wild and 
domestic pigs. While transmission dynamics of Ebolavirus have not been studied between wild and domestic pigs, 
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possible routes may be through direct contact, contact with urine and faeces in the environment and sharing of 
food via scavenging. Research on the spatial ecology of free-ranging domestic pigs in western Kenya revealed that 
the domestic pigs travelled an average of 4340 metres in a 12-hour period and had a mean home range of 10,343 
square metres with pigs spending on average 47% of their time outside their homestead of origin (Thomas et al. 
2013). There was a lack of significant difference between day and night time movements, indicating that the pigs 
were benefitting from a foraging strategy that involves both day and night scavenging. While the study tracked just 
10 pigs, the information it revealed is helpful in highlighting the risk scavenging may play in Ebolavirus transmission. 
The study revealed that free-ranging domestic pigs travel large distances, both during the day and at night, and 
that almost half of the time is spent outside their homestead, extending the geographic range and habitats these 
pigs scavenge and travel in. This large range and lengthier scavenging could be risk factors for Ebolavirus infection.
3. The eight bat species presumed to be reservoirs of Ebolavirus—E. franqueti, E. helvum, E. gambianus, E. labiatus, E. 
wahlbergi, H. monstrosus, M. torquata and R. aegyptiacus—are all found in Uganda. Given the different preferred 
habitats of these bats and the increase in pig populations in Uganda over the past 30 years, increasing contact 
between pigs and fruit bats would be likely. In the districts where EVD outbreaks in Uganda have been recorded, 
the estimated pig populations are as shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Pig populations in the districts of reported EVD outbreaks in Uganda 
District Households owning pigs Average herd size Pig population
Gulu 6200 2 26,570
Bundibugyo 3390 2 14,690
Luwero 22,850 2 59,040
Kibaale 53,360 2 153,510 (highest in Western region)
 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2008). 
      The rising demand for pork in Uganda has sparked a massive expansion of intensive pig production in the country.  
      Pigs are preferred to other livestock species due to their relatively rapid growth rate, large litter sizes and  
      potential to provide financial returns over a relatively short time. This intensification of pig production increases  
      pig-human contact and when added to the poor pig husbandry practices rampant throughout Uganda, potential  
      public health consequences ensue, like pig-to-human Ebolavirus transmission.
4.    Aerosol transmission between domestic pigs, between pigs and humans and between wild and domestic pigs 
      cannot be overlooked. Experimentally infected pigs spread Ebolavirus to naïve pigs presumably through aerosols 
      from the oronasal mucosa, which were found to have high titres of Ebolavirus (Kobinger et al. 2011). This study 
      was interesting in that the contact pigs that became infected had a less severe disease course than those that had 
      been experimentally infected. The risk of aerosol transmission needs further study, but the initial findings support 
      the possibility of aerosol transmission of Ebolavirus by pigs.
      Given that there are a number of human cases where the source of infection was unknown, it was interesting  
      to note that during an ILRI-led assessment of Uganda smallholder pig value chains, the Safe Food, Fair Food  
      project observed that producers and consumers ate pork especially during Easter and Christmas. It is typical for  
      meat to be consumed on special occasions in Uganda. Overlaying outbreaks of Ebolavirus in Uganda with seasonal  
      pork consumption patterns shows outbreaks near peak pork consumption periods, where increased handling,  
      slaughter and transporting of pigs would happen (Figure 16).
30 Ebola risk assessment in the pig value chain in Uganda
Figure 16. Seasonal pork consumption patterns overlaid with Ebolavirus outbreaks in Uganda.
Source: Roesel and Carter (2013).
Outlining EVD outbreaks with their proximity to public holidays shows some association, given an incubation 
period of 2–21 days for infected patients to become symptomatic. This may be purely coincidental but it is 
worth noting (Table 7).
Table 7. Date of first suspected EVD cases and proximity to national holidays 
Date of first 
suspected case
Location Holiday Incubation period
30 Aug 2000 Gulu 19 Aug: Eid ul Fitr (End of Ramadan) 11 days
6 May 2011 Luwero 1 May: Labour Day 5 days
Beginning of July 
2012
Kibaale 3 June: Martyrs’ Day
9 June: National Heroes’ Day
2–3 weeks
25 Oct 2012 Luwero 9 Oct: Independence Day 16 days
Research to understand transmission dynamics of ASF in Uganda highlighted the role of the sale of sick pigs and the 
sale and consumption of pork from the dead pigs in spreading and extending an outbreak of ASF in Gulu (Tejler 2012). 
This outbreak of ASF happened around Independence Day, a national holiday during which meat is typically consumed. 
In addition, the research found that many of the pigs that died as a result of the ASF outbreak were consumed either 
on the farm or sold to the butcher in the local community. Both the practice of eating pigs that have died of unknown 
causes and the sale of sick pigs would spread and extend an outbreak of Ebolavirus in pigs and increase the risk of 
spillover into humans.
Most pig farmers sell their pigs live, using the money from the sale to cater for family needs and purchasing a kilogram 
of pork for their own consumption (Roesel and Carter 2013). Given that pork is a luxury item consumed on special 
occasions like public holidays, the risk of Ebolavirus infection from pigs to humans may be seasonal, linked with periods 
of greater pork consumption and hence live pig sales and movement. The highest risk is at farm level via direct contact 
with infected body fluids and during slaughter, where contact with blood, internal organs and other body fluids is a 
part of the process. At the household consumption level, the risk of Ebolavirus infection is most likely only if the raw 
pork is handled in preparation for cooking. Eating of processed pork does not pose a significant risk at present, based 
on current knowledge of Ebolavirus stability and pork cooking and preservation techniques.
 Outbreaks
Rainy season
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Human-to-human transmission
Transmission from one person to another occurs by direct contact with infected body fluids such as blood, sweat, 
saliva, semen, vaginal fluids, urine and sputum or through direct inoculation by contaminated instruments such 
as needles, pins and razor blades. Nosocomial transmission through contaminated needles and syringes has been 
documented (Lamunu et al. 2004). Large outbreaks of EVD are usually driven by person-to-person transmission with 
caregivers both at home and in hospital at particular risk (Bausch et al. 2007).
Contact with body fluids, direct physical contact with an infected person and touching the body of an infected 
deceased person were practices of patients who became infected during the 2000 Gulu outbreak. In addition, 
indirect transmission from sleeping on the same mat, participating in ritual hand washing during the funeral ceremony 
and sharing a communal meal during the funeral service were significantly associated with disease. Risk tended to 
increase with an increasing number of different direct contacts. The risk of infection was higher among persons who 
were exposed through two or three different types of direct contact compared to those who had no direct contact 
(Francesconi et al. 2003).
In a different study carried out during the Gulu outbreak, the three most important means of transmission were 
identified as attending the funerals of presumptive EVD case patients where ritual contacts with the deceased 
occurred, and intrafamilial or nosocomial transmission (CDC 2001).
Gulu outbreak: During the 2000 Gulu outbreak, secondary outbreaks occurred in Masindi and Mbarara districts 
from infected individuals traveling from Gulu. A woman who had been treated at St. Mary’s Hospital Lacor in Gulu 
for an unrelated chronic condition by a nurse, who later died of EVD, left the hospital and returned to her home 
in Masindi District (ProMED-mail 2000). During this secondary outbreak in Masindi, the index case patient became 
the origin of transmission within her own extended family (18 further cases), from index family members to Masindi 
healthcare workers (six cases) and from Masindi healthcare workers to their household contacts (one case). Because 
of multiple simultaneous contacts, transmission chains within the index family could not be established but this 
intrafamilial transmission is consistent with human-to-human transmission of Ebolavirus. It was also confirmed that 
two family members had been buried before the EVD outbreak in Masindi. Figure 17 shows the EVD isolation ward in 
Lacor Hospital. 
Figure 17. EVD isolation ward, Lacor Hospital, Gulu. 
Photo courtesy of www.nydailynews.com.
Breaches in barrier nursing by the nursing staff resulted in six of the occupational cases among the Masindi healthcare 
workers. The household contact of the Masindi healthcare worker was a two-year-old child who became infected 
after close contact with its hospitalized and infected mother (Borchert et al. 2011). This secondary outbreak 
confirmed the typical transmission dynamics in humans: nosocomial and intrafamilial.
The secondary outbreak in Mbarara was started by an infected soldier being transferred from Gulu to Mbarara. 
This secondary outbreak ended rather quickly with five cases and four deaths. The details of these cases are not 
known. Given the stigma in Uganda associated with EVD, protecting patients’ privacy, including their identification, is 
understandable.
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  Survivors… in their own words
‘People still shun me. I feel stigmatized. I have failed to 
resume my business.’ (Mugerwa and Kalungi 2012)
‘Whenever I go to buy goods, people run away from me.’ 
(Mugerwa and Ssenkabirwa 2012)
‘Neighbours have shunned my house… When I send a 
‘boda boda’ (motorcycle taxi) to buy for me cement or any 
other materials, he doesn’t return. No one is willing to give 
me a lift. I feel troubled.’ (Mugerwa 2012a).
A follow-up of EVD patients seven years after the 2000 Gulu outbreak found that several still complained of chronic 
conditions such as headache, chest pain, problems with eyesight, pain in joints and other body parts, general body 
weakness, swelling in the legs and inability to do any heavy lifting (Ocowun and Wendo 2007). Survivors of the 
Bundibugyo outbreak also confirmed weakened hearing and vision (Croome 2011).
Bundibugyo outbreak: The Bundibugyo outbreak in 2007 was amplified by nosocomial transmission. Five 
healthcare workers who treated an EVD patient were infected and died. While early reports claimed that the initial 
cases had eaten a dead goat, the story later changed, confirming they had eaten a monkey (Butagira et al. 2007b). It 
should be noted that the hospital had no isolation ward or protective gear for this initial EVD patient (ProMED-mail 
2007).
In an effort to avert the spread of Ebolavirus from Bundibugyo to other districts, many different measures were taken. 
In Fort Portal District, about 45 minutes from Bundibugyo, hotels were advised not to provide hand towels for drying 
over fear that the virus could be spread on these towels. In Hoima District, all visitors from Bundibugyo District were 
stopped. Additionally, oil workers at the Kingfisher oil site, a large oil well in Uganda managed by Heritage Oil and 
Gas Company at the time, were sensitized about the risks of contracting EVD. Figure 18 shows a member of the EVD 
sensitization team at work.
Figure 18. EVD sensitization team.
Photo courtesy of www.newvision.co.ug.
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Two non-governmental organizations, World Wildlife Fund and Save the Children, suspended their operations 
and withdrew all of their personnel from Kasese and Bundibugyo. Furthermore, in Kasese District, which borders 
Bundibugyo District, the selling and drinking of ‘mulwa’, a drink brewed from millet, was banned for fear that sharing 
the straw could spread the virus. All public places and bars selling mulwa were closed. The transport of smoked fish 
from Bundibugyo to Kasese was halted because, according to the Kasese District vice-chairperson, ‘the smoked fish 
business could contribute to the escalation of the disease’. Finally in Kibaale District, which shares a border with 
Bundibugyo District along Lake Albert, the local government banned all intra-district transactions with Bundibugyo, 
closed all businesses on the shore of Lake Victoria and had the police enforce the parking of all boats at landing sites, 
halting fishing activities and the transport of passengers from Congo and Bundibugyo (Kayizzi et al. 2007). An article 
published in a national newspaper during the Bundibugyo outbreak attempted to quell public panic over contracting 
Ebolavirus from handshakes, public pay phones, touching money, hugging, public toilets and spitting in public (Baguma 
2007).
Students at Kyambogo University in Kampala caused such a scare on campus after returning from the funeral of 
a relative in western Uganda, that the Ministry of Health officials placed the students under medical observation 
(Butagira et al. 2007a).
In Hoima District, when a patient vomiting blood was admitted to Hoima Referral Hospital, medical workers 
scattered in disarray (Butagira et al. 2007c). The patient died a few hours later but not from EVD. The cause of this 
patient’s death was never released.
The president of Uganda refused to shake hands with a visiting delegation from the DRC over fear of contracting 
EVD. He even urged Ugandans to avoid handshakes to ‘minimize further dispersion of Ebola to the countryside’ 
(Butagira and Matsiko 2007).
As the number of EVD cases declined in Bundibugyo, WHO reported on the measures that were most successful in 
control: safe burial of EVD patients, reducing the number of attendants providing food and medicines in the isolation 
ward, reducing visits to less than 10 minutes in the isolation ward and washing hands before entering and after leaving 
the isolation camp (Butagira et al. 2007c).
Many local people suspected that the EVD outbreak was started by infected monkeys, especially after dead monkey 
carcasses were reported to the Uganda Wildlife Authority in Rwenzori National Park in Bundibugyo District 
(Ainganiza 2008). These carcasses were not analysed for Ebolavirus.
Single case in Luwero: In the single case of EVD in Luwero in May 2011, a 12-year-old infected girl was transported 
by motorcycle taxi 35 kilometres to the hospital. At the time of transport she was experiencing vaginal bleeding and 
vomiting blood. However, despite infectious virus being found in blood during the acute phase of infection (Bausch 
et al. 2007), the driver of the motorcycle taxi and the girl’s grandmother and father who helped transport her to 
the hospital did not become infected (Shoemaker et al. 2012). While anecdotal in evidence, this shows that infected 
individuals using public transport may not pose much of a risk of transmission, as long as passengers do not come in 
contact with body fluids.
Kibaale outbreak: The Kibaale outbreak in July–August 2012 was started by a three-month-old girl who was 
thought to have been bitten by a monkey. The infection spread when 15 people who attended her funeral later 
contracted the disease (ProMED-mail 2012b). As noted earlier, the communal rituals of burial in Uganda favour the 
spread of Ebolavirus.
One patient was infected when he sneaked into the isolation ward at Kagadi Hospital and stole a phone from an EVD 
patient (Mugerwa 2012b). This is not hard to imagine when a picture of the containment unit at Kagadi Hospital was 
released in the local newspapers (Figure 19).
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Figure 19. Entrance to the containment unit at Kagadi Hospital, Kibaale District. 
Photo courtesy of www.msf.org.
During the Kibaale outbreak, all public gatherings in the district were banned and markets, schools and other venues 
of social gatherings were closed from 28 July to 30 August (Kasooha 2012). Taxi operators noted a decline in 
passengers visiting the region, with few people boarding taxis to Kibaale District. Police intervention was also required 
to contain patients at Kagadi isolation ward over alleged neglect. The patients had been complaining of a shortage of 
food and clean water and that ‘no doctor was attending to them’ (Tumussime et al. 2012). Additionally, large groups 
were banned from visiting the Parliament in Kampala. Members of Parliament were also requested to suspend calling 
visits and arranging school visits in their constituencies. The Special Forces Group, the president’s security group, 
was advised to avoid unnecessary movement to high-risk areas like Kibaale and neighbouring districts (Mugerwa et al. 
2012). In a rather bizarre request, President Museveni even banned all physical contact after reports that the outbreak 
had spread to Kampala. He called on people ‘not to shake hands to avoid the spread of the killer virus’ and to ‘avoid 
promiscuity because this sickness can also go through sex’ (Agencies 2012). Finally, visits to prisons were suspended 
for two weeks in efforts to prevent infected people from coming into contact with prisoners and spreading Ebolavirus 
(Arinaitwe 2012).
A clinical officer who attended to the dead at Kagadi Hospital was transferred to Mulago Hospital in the capital city 
of Kampala (ProMED-mail 2012a). She died at Mulago Hospital. Doctors and nurses who attended to her while at 
Mulago Hospital were quarantined, creating mass panic that a secondary EVD outbreak would occur in Kampala. 
However, aside from the transferred clinical officer who died at Mulago Hospital, there were no additional EVD cases 
in Kampala.
Luwero outbreak: During the outbreak in November 2012, the initial case in Luwero was a motorcycle taxi driver. 
Presumably he would have had contact with many people due to the nature of his work. However, the only other 
confirmed cases originating from this index patient were two of his family members who assisted with his care once 
he became sick (ProMED-mail 2012c). This case also supports the role of intrafamilial transmission while also adding 
to evidence that sharing public transport with an infected person is not per se a high-risk practice. The risk is contact 
with infected body fluids. However, transporting infected patients would extend the geographic range of an EVD 
outbreak, complicating outbreak control.
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Initial reports from the field communicated widespread panic among the health centres in Luwero, with patients 
abandoning the health units and medical personnel claiming they had not received protective gear (Wandera 2012). 
During this outbreak, the burial team in Luwero narrowly escaped lynching by upset mourners who accused the burial 
team of violating Muslim burial rites (Ayebazibwe et al. 2012). According to Islamic burial rites, the body must be 
washed before burial. Figure 20 shows the burial team disinfecting the coffin of an EVD patient.
Figure 20. Burial team disinfecting the coffin of an EVD patient. 
 
Photo courtesy of www.usatoday.net.
Traditional healers were also banned from admitting patients they did not know during the outbreak (Ayebazibwe et 
al. 2012). As the Ministry of Health relies on healthcare facilities to report suspected EVD cases, patients presenting 
to traditional healers would fall outside the surveillance activities established during EVD outbreaks.
A formal outbreak plan was announced by the Ministry of Health (Ayebazibwe 2012) and included the following 
measures:
1. A team of experts from the Ministry of Health, WHO, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and the African Field 
Epidemiology Network are already on the ground to support the response plan. 
2. A national task force coordinated by the Ministry of Health has now refocused its attention to the Luwero  
epidemic since the Marburg situation in western Uganda is fully under control. 
3. Plans are underway to create an isolation facility at Nyimbwa Health Centre IV or Bombo Military Hospital.
4. The Luwero District task force has been reactivated and is developing a response plan.
5. Active and sustained tracing and listing of all possible contacts that were exposed to the suspected and  
confirmed cases are in high gear. So far, a number of contacts have been recorded and are being closely  
monitored. 
6. The isolation facility at Mulago National Referral Hospital, Kampala has already been reopened and has  
admitted two suspect cases.
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7. The necessary drug supplies and logistics for case management have been mobilized. The national medical  
stores have been requested to send the necessary logistics. 
8. MSF is already on the ground to evaluate and mobilize the necessary requirements for setting up an  
appropriate isolation centre at Nyimbwa Health Centre IV or Bombo Military Hospital. 
9. The ministry has already dispatched personal protective equipment and body bags to Luwero District.
10. Collection of samples from suspect and probable cases has already commenced. Last evening, two samples  
were taken from suspect cases admitted at Mulago National Referral Hospital.
In addition to the above mentioned action items, the Ministry of Health created national hotlines for people to report 
any suspect cases (Businge 2012) and briefed communities about EVD via radio talk shows (Mugerwa and Ayebazibwe 
2012).
National newspaper articles have mentioned the proximity of EVD outbreaks to the Congo and Sudan borders and 
to large settlements of Rwandese, Congolese and Sudanese refugees. Particular blame seems to be towards infected 
Congolese refugees bringing EVD into Uganda, followed by infected soldiers in Congo or Sudan crossing into Uganda 
for healthcare. During the Gulu outbreak, several Ugandan soldiers were among the fatalities, raising fears that 
returning Ugandan troops and their Congolese wives had brought EVD into Uganda (WHO 2000). There have been 
no firm links between infected soldiers, immigrants or refugees bringing EVD into Uganda. However, given the porous 
borders between DRC, Sudan and Uganda, the threat of EVD being introduced by soldiers, refugees and immigrants 
cannot be ruled out.
Other considerations
Uganda has several important factors that favour increasingly higher EVD incidence in humans. First, Uganda’s 
population is projected to quadruple in the next 40 years (Population Reference Bureau 2011). The pressure on land 
to produce food for the growing population will place people into greater contact with wildlife, including nonhuman 
primates and fruit bats, and domestic livestock. 
Eighty per cent of Ugandans are engaged in agriculture (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2007). Agriculture is the 
backbone of the economy, providing livelihood to many of Uganda’s citizens. The predicted population explosion 
will place pressure on livestock production to address infections that affect production outputs. A more thorough 
understanding of how Ebolavirus infection impacts the health and productivity of pigs, and hence the livelihoods of pig 
farmers, will help prioritize how limited resources can be efficiently expended to ensure human health, livelihoods, 
food security and food safety.
In Uganda, human health is also affected by the dual burden of disease, battling a host of infectious conditions and 
chronic health problems. National malnutrition rates are abysmal; 39.1% of children below five years of age are 
stunted for their age (WHO 2010). Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) prevalence stands at 6.5% (WHO 2010) 
though rumours around the medical community indicate that the rate is higher and rising (Maseruka and Asiimwe 
2011). Malaria accounts for 11% of adult deaths each year. Tuberculosis prevalence is around 3% (WHO 2010). There 
is also a growing incidence of diabetes (Basudde 2011). Malnutrition and other chronic health conditions weaken the 
body’s immune system, making the host particularly less likely to mount and sustain an immune response. The role 
that malnutrition and co-infection play in Ebolavirus infection and disease outcome is yet to be determined. Suffice it to 
say that Uganda has a segment of the population that is immunologically vulnerable to infection.
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Conclusions
EVD has a tendency to create public panic locally, nationally, regionally and globally, disproportionate to the actual risk 
of infection. Since research into the role pigs play in maintaining and transmitting Ebolavirus is limited, and there is no 
need for rash decisions like the Reuters article (Mogato 2009) detailing the slaughter of pigs in the Philippines after the 
discovery of Reston ebolavirus, general risk factors favouring Ebolavirus infection in pigs in Uganda will be outlined.
1. Pig production in Uganda has significantly increased over the last 30 years. A higher density of pigs may favour 
Ebolavirus transmission between pigs and from pigs to humans due to increased direct contact.
2. These higher pig populations raised under tethering or free-range systems create overlap of fruit bat habitats (and 
their dropped fruit, excrement, saliva and urine) where these pigs scavenge for food. 
3. The risk to commercial pig farming is poorly understood. It may be possible that fruit bats roost in pig structures 
and direct contact with their excrement and urine are the biggest risk factors. The website of the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature notes that M. torquata is adaptable and has been found in city gardens. Also, 
given that many farmers in Uganda engage in mixed farming, it is possible that pig operations are more at risk 
from having fruit trees within a certain geographic distance and pigs scavenging fruits. Perhaps the cultivation of 
fruit trees in addition to pig keeping creates suitable habitats for fruit bats to forage and structures to roost in, 
fostering direct contact. 
4. The human population is experiencing dramatic growth in Uganda. In addition to the increasing contact between 
humans and wildlife, livestock follow these people as walking bank accounts. As humans encroach into new 
habitats, so will their livestock. Some of these new environments will include bat and nonhuman primate habitats. 
This may cause the incidence of EVD outbreaks to increase as infected hosts and their body fluids come in direct 
contact with suitable hosts at a higher frequency. It should also be noted that as more humans infringe into 
nonhuman primate and bat habitats, the human need for protein may drive an increase in hunting and bushmeat 
consumption. Pigs may become infected from scavenging the waste products of bushmeat hunting.
5. At present, the risk to pork products is very poorly understood. It is based on anecdotal evidence at best. 
Given the link between hunting and consumption of bushmeat with Ebolavirus infection, there is a chance that 
slaughtering pigs and certain methods of handling raw pork may pose a greater risk of Ebolavirus infection and 
pork contamination.
6. The disease course and outcome of different strains of Ebolavirus infection in pigs is also in its research infancy. 
To date, there is no research into natural or experimental infection in pigs with Bundibugyo ebolavirus or Sudan 
ebolavirus. Even the Zaire ebolavirus study was done under experimental conditions, where the pigs were kept in 
conditions dissimilar to those in Uganda. 
7. The role pigs may play in Ebolavirus transmission is poorly understood. The present data suggest they may be 
amplifying hosts, but likely not reservoir hosts. This suggests the conditions under which pigs become infected 
with Ebolavirus and the role they play in transmission may have many variables that will have to be elucidated. 
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Likewise, perhaps the increasing pig densities, coupled with higher human densities and both pigs and humans in 
contact with nonhuman primates and fruit bats, will create highly favourable conditions for Ebolavirus amplification 
and maintenance, increasing both the frequency and incidence of Ebolavirus outbreaks.
8. While the 31 pig samples taken as part of an ecological study after the Kibaale outbreak were all negative 
by serology (IgG ELISA), the number of samples was very small and not representative enough to draw any 
conclusions. Additionally, the pigs sampled were all healthy. Dr Jonathan Towner of CDC Atlanta noted in his 
presentation (Towner 2013) that in fruit bats, virus isolation was more successful from liver and spleen tissue 
samples than from blood. This is something to consider if a field survey of pigs is undertaken in future. 
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Recommendations
There are still many unknowns about Ebolavirus and its ecology and transmission. However, what is established is that 
Uganda has had EVD in the past, so the pathogen is present. It is also home to suitable hosts—humans, nonhuman 
primates, fruit bats and pigs. These hosts have a number of different habitats and situations that place them in direct 
contact with each other and their infected body fluids. Some of these hosts are increasing in density and numbers, 
namely, humans and pigs. Given ILRI’s commitment to food safety and food security while sustaining the millions of 
poor farmers who rely on livestock for income and employment, listed below are recommendations for further work:
1. Since the reservoir of Ebolavirus still has not been conclusively identified, the role pigs play in Ebolavirus 
maintenance and transmission needs further research. To help identify what role pigs play in Ebolavirus 
maintenance and transmission, a prevalence study to determine the percentage of pigs infected with Ebolavirus in 
Uganda would be a good first step. This will also determine the geographical areas of greatest infection as well 
as whether breed or sex of the pigs impacts infection. Dr Charles Masembe of Makerere University has offered 
ILRI pig serum samples collected during his ASF research for analysis and it would be worth checking with the 
National Animal Disease and Diagnostic Centre in Entebbe about utilizing stored pig serum samples from their 
ongoing disease outbreak investigations. This data could be compiled into risk maps to identify Ebolavirus hotspots 
in Uganda.
2. Administration of a questionnaire to pig farmers to determine whether links between housing, surrounding farm 
habitat and contact with wildlife, bats, domestic pets or other livestock increase or decrease the risk of infection. 
This will help determine specific risk factors to infection in pigs as well as form the basis for best-bet interventions 
to prevent and control infection.
3. Further research is also needed to determine whether Ebolavirus is activated or reactivated during certain periods 
of a pig’s life cycle.
4. At present, animal samples must be sent either to South Africa or Atlanta, Georgia in the United States of 
America for analysis. Building capacity in Uganda for laboratories to be able to diagnose and confirm Ebolavirus in 
domestic livestock and wildlife and to develop field diagnostic kits will speed up diagnosis and its confirmation in 
animals. 
5. The Ministry of Health already has a system for reporting suspected human EVD cases. However the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries has no mechanism to report suspected Ebolavirus cases in animals. 
In addition to creating a reporting system for the Ministry of Agriculture, there is a need to link the reporting 
systems of the two ministries to ensure timely outbreak response and containment and efficient use of personnel 
and resources.
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6. Identify best-bet interventions and tools to train pig farmers in the prevention of Ebolavirus in their pigs, 
households and communities.
7. Given that Ebolavirus has many different suitable hosts, ILRI will need to partner with different organizations in 
human and wildlife health to stay informed of new developments in the understanding of Ebolavirus ecology that 
will inform better interventions in the pig value chain in Uganda.
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